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This thesis aims to address uncertainty within the legal regulatory environment of the duty to 
consult in Canada. It will examine the role of the National Energy Board in conducting 
consultations with Indigenous peoples when their rights may be adversely impacted by 
natural resource development projects. In Clyde River et. al. v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., 
2017, the Supreme Court of Canada found the National Energy Board’s consultation with 
Inuit to be inadequate. The findings are based on an in-depth analysis of the Court’s decision. 
 
In this research, I discuss the prospect of the duty to consult as a unique mechanism for 
facilitating dialogue about Aboriginal rights under s.35 of the Canadian Constitution. I also 
consider the potential for consultative dialogue to further a process of legal reconciliation of 
the pre-existence of distinct Indigenous societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty. 
Lastly, I examine the Supreme Court’s ruling in Clyde River that the Crown may rely on the 
National Energy Board to fulfil its duty to consult.  
 
I argue that the National Energy Board’s regulatory process is insufficient to conduct 
consultations that positively affect the prospect of legal reconciliation. The Board’s mandate 
fails to direct consultative inquiry to address the concerns Indigenous peoples have about 
potential impacts on their rights. The Board’s weak consultation in Clyde River is evidence 
that its mandate requires modernizing if it is to maintain the honour of the Crown and respect 
Aboriginal rights. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On November 11, 2016, residents from the community of Clyde River, Nunavut took their 
seats in the public gallery of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). For the following seven 
hours, the Supreme Court justices heard the arguments presented by the appellants and the 
respondents in Hamlet of Clyde River, et al. v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc. (PGS)., 2017 
SCC 401. On appeal was the National Energy Board’s (NEB) authorization of a 5-year 
seismic testing permit for oil and gas resources in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait that threatened 
to harm the marine animals that Inuit peoples across the eastern coast of Baffin Island depend 
on for subsistence and livelihood. The project application was submitted by a consortium of 
three companies.2 Inuit of Clyde River challenged this approval on the grounds that the NEB 
did not adequately fulfil the community’s right to consultation – a right that is enshrined in 
Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution Act. On July 27, 2017, just eight months after the 
case was heard, the Supreme Court held that the appeal should be allowed and the NEB’s 
authorization for the project should be quashed. Yet the Court also ruled that the Crown can 
discharge the duty to consult to the NEB because the Board’s statutory powers enable it to 
conduct consultations. Following the decision, Inuit celebrations erupted all over social media 
platforms, highlighting the culmination of their efforts to protect their rights to harvest. The 
Supreme Court’s affirmation that the Crown can rely on regulatory tribunals, like the NEB, to 
fulfil its duty to consult will impact the future of the relationship between the Crown and 
Indigenous3 peoples in Canada.  
 
Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution defines who constitutes Aboriginal peoples under the 
law in Canada and provides that any “existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed” (Constitution Act, 1982, s.35(1)). The 
specific rights enshrined in s.35 are not, however, expressed in the written text (Newman, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hereinafter Clyde River 
2	  The	  three	  companies	  that	  filed	  for	  a	  NEB	  project	  authorization	  in	  cooperation	  were	  Petroleum	  Geo-­‐
Services	  Inc.	  (PGS),	  Multi	  Klient	  Invest	  AS,	  and	  TGS-­‐NOPEC	  Geophysical	  Company	  AS;	  hereinafter	  PGS. 
3 In Canada, the term Aboriginal has been historically used to refer to First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples. It 
gained momentum when it was included in the defining of s. 35 of the Canadian Constitution 1982 to refer to 
rights specifically held by Indigenous peoples in Canada. Further, Aboriginal has been widely used in legislation 
and naming of government departments. However, the term Indigenous is preferred because of its alignment 
with the international indigenous movement and the political clout that comes with it. In my thesis, I will use the 
term Aboriginal when referring to rights as they are set out in s.35, and Indigenous when speaking about First 
Nations, Inuit and Métis communities more broadly.  
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2009, p. 14). As such, it has been the responsibility of the courts to define the scope of what 
these rights include and how they can be applied. For each constitutionally defined right there 
is generally an associated duty that is held by the government to honourably uphold when 
there is a potential infringement on an existing right or title claim. For instance, the 
substantive Aboriginal right to consultation imposes a procedural duty to consult upon the 
Crown whenever Indigenous lands or resources are threatened with interference (Devlin & 
Murphy, 2005, p. 277). 
  
The focus of my thesis lies at the intersection of the Crown’s duty to consult and the 
regulatory processes of administrative tribunals, as highlighted by the Clyde River case. The 
question of the content and scope of the duty to consult has been brought before the Supreme 
Court on multiple occasions, whereby the duty has been defined, particularly in regards to 
government action that engages Aboriginal peoples and their lands4. The Court has described 
actions that determine when the duty arises, and has provided legal criteria for the evaluation 
of whether consultation has been fulfilled. Through duty to consult jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that the duty to consult is owed specifically by governments, rather 
than third-party or corporate stakeholders (Newman, 2009, p. 35). In response, the Crown has 
often discharged its duty to consult Aboriginal peoples to administrative tribunals for reasons 
of bureaucratic efficiency. In circumstances that involve natural resource development 
projects, the Crown has relied on the NEB to fulfil its duty to consult.  
 
Although the duty to consult is required by s.35 of the Constitution, no formal arrangement 
has been reached between the Government and Indigenous peoples in Canada to define the 
process of consultation when competing interests arise5. As such, while some process of 
consultation is required when government action infringes or interferes with Aboriginal 
rights, no clearly defined or pre-determined procedure has yet been developed. The question 
of whether this is an acceptable and adequate process to uphold Aboriginal rights is the 
underlying concern of my thesis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Dwight Newman refers to these cases as the Haida Nation trilogy (Newman, 2009, p. 9). They include: Haida 
Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73, Taku River Tlingit First 
Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, 2004 SCC 74 and Mikisew Cree 
First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, 2005 SCC 69. 
5 This is in contrast to a country like Norway, where the Norwegian Government and Sami Parliament have 
signed an official consultation agreement (Government of Norway, 2007). 
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1.1 Research Questions 
The primary questions that guided my research were:  
How has the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Clyde River contributed to the duty 
to consult doctrine and the procedural execution (operationalization) of this duty in 
Canada? What does the decision means for the Court’s conception that the duty to 
consult aims to reconcile the pre-existence of distinct Indigenous societies with the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty?  
 
To answer these questions, my thesis must include three tasks. First, I will provide contextual 
background to the case and its ramifications. This will include details of the community of 
Clyde River and a clear explanation of the duty to consult, as it was developed in seminal 
Supreme Court cases on Aboriginal rights. 
 
Second, I will analyse the Supreme Court’s Clyde River decision as related to the role of 
regulatory tribunals in conducting consultation. The Clyde River case presented the court with 
four questions regarding the constitutional obligation of the Crown to fulfil the duty to 
consult. These questions were centered on the role that the NEB played in conducting 
consultations through its mandated regulatory approval process. I will consider the issue of 
legal reconciliation as developed through Supreme Court jurisprudence to understand the 
reasoning behind the Court’s judgement in Clyde River.  
 
Lastly, I will place the Supreme Court’s judgement in Clyde River within the context of past 
decisions related to Aboriginal rights and examine whether the NEB’s procedural mandate is 
sufficient to conduct adequate consultations that maintain the honour of the Crown. I aim to 
identify the implications of the Supreme Court’s affirmation that the Crown can rely on 
regulatory tribunals, such as the NEB, to fulfil its duty to consult and what it could mean for 
the future of legal reconciliation with Indigenous peoples in Canada.  
1.2 Significance of the Research 
The Canadian government has often turned to the judiciary to remedy rights violations, and 
particularly regarding the implementation of Aboriginal rights. The amendment of the 
Canadian Constitution in 1982 that introduced s.35 represented a long-awaited move to 
recognize and affirm that Aboriginal peoples are the first peoples of Canada, and by virtue of 
that fact, possess certain rights (Christie, 2002). Since then, the courts have heard an 
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increasing number of cases from Indigenous appellants regarding title claims or rights 
violations. Frustrated by this, the Supreme Court has emphasized the need for a decrease in 
reliance on litigation because it poses a risk to sustaining and building a respectful 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown (Clyde River, para: 24).  
However, the Crown’s observed reliance on regulatory processes, such as the NEB’s, to fulfil 
the duty to consult has caused some uncertainty (Devlin & Murphy, 2001; Popowich, 2007; 
Newman, 2005, p. 60). Without clearly defined sets of procedures that interact directly with 
Aboriginal title claims and land rights, navigating the relationships supposedly built on 
consultation becomes even more challenging. Particularly in the natural resource development 
sector, governments and industry must play close attention to the constantly changing 
landscape of law in order to successfully develop respectful relationships with Indigenous 
groups (Newman, 2009). Uncertainty around what type of action or procedure constitutes 
consultation creates problems for Indigenous communities (Harman, 2016). A lack of clarity 
in procedural guidelines can result in Indigenous communities withholding engagement in 
consultation on the grounds that the duty has not been triggered and any participation may be 
adversely used against them.  
 
My research on the Clyde River case will contribute to the literature on the development of 
the duty to consult, and more specifically provide insight for Indigenous communities on how 
to operationalize the Supreme Court’s ruling.   
1.3 Data and Methods  
My research was primarily informed by four sources of information central to the Clyde River 
case: 
a. The National Energy Board’s collection of correspondence documents starting with 
PGS’ initial project application in 2011 and ending with the final authorization for the 
seismic testing project in 2014.6 This includes the Environmental Impact Assessment 
carried out by the NEB. 
b. The Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Hamlet of Clyde River v. TGS NOPEC 
Geophysical Company ASA (TGS).7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A collection of these documents can be found on the NEB’s website: https://www.neb-
one.gc.ca/nrth/dscvr/2011tgs/index-eng.html 
7 The Federal Court’s ruling can be found online: http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-
caf/decisions/en/item/111287/index.do?r=AAAAAQALY2x5ZGUgcml2ZXIB 
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c. The Memorandum of Fact and Law submitted by the counsel for the Hamlet of 
Clyde River to the Supreme Court of Canada.8 
d. The Supreme Court of Canada’s judgement in Hamlet of Clyde River, et al. v. 
Petroleum Geo-Services Inc. (PGS), et al.9 
 
These documents were central in informing my understanding of the consultation process that 
occurred between PGS, the community of Clyde River, and the NEB. In order to understand 
the duty to consult more concretely, I also reviewed previous Canadian Aboriginal case law 
and associated jurisprudence. In my approach to analysing the literature on these cases, I 
focused my attention on the concept of reconciliation and its relation to the duty to consult as 
introduced and articulated by Supreme Court judgements. Consequently, the concept of legal 
reconciliation informed my theoretical perspectives which are explained in the following 
chapter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This document can be retrieved from the Supreme Court’s website: http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-
DocumentsWeb/36692/MM010_Applicants_Hamlet-of-Clyde-River-et-al_Application.pdf 
9 The Supreme Court’s ruling can be found online: https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-
csc/en/item/16743/index.do	  
	   6	  
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Canada has fashioned a uniquely court-driven and constitutionally focused jurisprudence of 
reconciliation that is not found in other colonial states (McHugh, 2004, p. 579)10. In order to 
understand the legal concept of reconciliation, I will explain its origins in Canadian 
jurisprudence. Then, I will present Mark Walter’s concept of ‘reconciliation as relationship’. 
Lastly, I will argue that the most useful tool for pursuing legal reconciliation is found in the 
duty to consult.  
2.1 The Legal Reconciliation of Two Sovereignties 
Reconciliation is best highlighted by the Supreme Court’s ruling in R. v. Van der Peet,11 
which states that the basic purpose of s.35 is “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of 
aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown” (Van der Peet, para: 31). In effect, 
legal reconciliation, as discussed through the Supreme Court, is one that aims to reconcile the 
distinct interests and cultures of Indigenous peoples and the assertion of Crown sovereignty. 
This understanding of reconciliation recognizes that Indigenous peoples existed in distinct 
societies before the Crown asserted sovereignty over Canada.  
2.2.1 ‘Reconciliation as Relationship’ 
Mark Walters (2008, p. 167) purports that there are three modes of legal reconciliation. 
‘Reconciliation as resignation’ refers to “a one-sided, asymmetrical process” whereby one 
side is resigned to a state of affairs that is unfavourable and beyond its control (Walters, 2008, 
p. 167). According to Walters, ‘reconciliation as consistency’ refers to a technical process of 
fitting disparate parts together (Walters, 2008, p.167). This mode of reconciliation is 
governed by a set of rules that aim to reduce uncertainty. Lastly, Walters defines 
‘reconciliation as relationship’ as a reciprocal process that involves acts of mutual respect that 
aim to create the foundations for a harmonious relationship (Walters, 2008, p. 168). This form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Reconciliation in Canada has taken many forms, and is not exclusively situated within the legal-constitutional 
sphere. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was a formal project undertaken by the Canadian 
government in 2008 to address and provide remedies to the effects of Indian Residential Schools and 
assimilation policies on Indigenous communities: Canada, 2015. Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the 
Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada., Winnipeg. Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. 
11 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R 507, hereinafter Van der Peet 
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of legal reconciliation provides the most appropriate theoretical framework for analysing the 
Supreme Court’s judgement in Clyde River. 
 
Several critics see the Canadian jurisprudence of s.35 rights through the lens of reconciliation 
as relationship. Dale Turner (2006)12 argues that the assertion of Crown sovereignty in the 
Van der Peet judgement is tied to the idea that the Crown is the highest form of political 
sovereignty in Canada, and explains that what we are seeing is a continued form of 
colonialism (Coulthard, 2008, p. 165). In rooting his argument in the Van der Peet decision, 
Turner only views reconciliation that facilitates the subordination of Indigenous territorial 
claims to Crown sovereignty and the unbridled infringement on Aboriginal rights (Turner, 
2006). Yet, the Supreme Court has determined that any mode of ‘reconciliation as 
resignation’ cannot adequately address the sovereignties of Indigenous peoples and the Crown 
(Sparrow, 1990; Van der Peet, 1996).  
 
John Borrows (2010), on the other hand, supports a place for indigenous customary law 
within the Canadian constitutional order under some form of legal pluralism. Borrows is 
optimistic that legal pluralism can create a space for Indigenous legal traditions to be 
reconciled with an expanded view of Indigenous rights in Canadian law. The accommodation 
of legal pluralism in the Canadian Constitution resembles Walters’ mode of ‘reconciliation as 
consistency’. Although this mode of reconciliation may be satisfactory, it is unlikely as the 
Constitution is currently unable to accommodate two, separate legal orders.  
 
Reconciliation as relationship provides the most appropriate theoretical framework for 
analysing the Supreme Court’s judgement in Clyde River. Melissa Williams’ (2005) idea of 
citizenship as shared fate compliments Walters’ reconciliation as relationship. Citizenship as 
shared fate explains that although there exists a plurality of nations within the fabric of the 
Canadian state, individuals are inextricably placed within a network of relationships. In this 
sense, a dialogue about Aboriginal rights is facilitated by an understanding of relationship and 
through varying processes of carrying out legal reconciliation (Tully, 2006). I argue that 
consultation is the most productive space where dialogue about s.35 rights can happen within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Dale Turner does insist that any process of legal reconciliation must be rooted in dialogue, but views the 
current constitutional framework as shutting out any possibility for meaningful dialogue. Because the duty to 
consult is rooted in this constitutional framework, Turner excludes any possibility to speak about the duty as a 
space that can produce meaningful dialogue. See: Turner, D. (2006). This is Not a Peace Pipe. University of 
Toronto Press. p. 28, 29, 108, 112. 
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the legal mode of reconciliation as relationship (Stevenson, 2015, p. 373). Importantly, Sakej 
Youngblood Henderson (2006; 2007; 2009) has encouraged literature on reconciliation to 
look back on the spirit of the historical treaties signed between Indigenous peoples and the 
Crown to inform the process of reconciliation today. Varying Indigenous principles and 
customs informed relations between peoples in reciprocal and respectful ways (Walters, 2008, 
pp. 170-171). Additionally, the Supreme Court has emphasized the role of treaties as an 
integral part of reconciling two distinct sovereignties (Van der Peet, para: 31; Haida Nation, 
para: 17). This fits within Walter’s mode of reconciliation as relationship because it 
underscores the importance of respectful dialogue in reconciling Indigenous pre-existence 
with asserted Crown sovereignty through relationship.  
 
2.3 Reconciliation as Relationship and the Duty to Consult 
Prior to the development of the duty to consult, the government simply had to provide a 
legislative objective for the infringement of an Aboriginal right. In Haida, the Supreme Court 
set out a sliding scale for which to evaluate the duty to consult (Newman, 2009, pp. 48-49), 
which arises when the “Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence 
of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it” 
(Haida Nation: para 35). Here, there are three elements of the duty: the knowledge element; 
the strength of the Aboriginal right or claim; and the potential for adverse impact. These three 
elements are what dictate the depth of consultation required. Importantly, the Haida analysis 
applies a duty to consult even where there is uncertainty about an Aboriginal rights claim or 
title. 
 
In the Haida ruling, the judges determined that “the government’s duty to consult with 
Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests is grounded in the honour of the Crown” 
(Haida Nation, para: 16). The honour of the Crown is born out of the Crown’s asserted 
sovereignty over the state and thereby dictates that the government must act in good faith 
relationships with Indigenous peoples because they have a competing claim to sovereignty 
(Sanderson, Buergner, & Jones, 2012). Further, the Court goes on to state that: 
“In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of Crown sovereignty 
to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown must act 
honourably. Nothing less is required if we are to achieve the reconciliation of the pre-
existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown” (para: 17). 
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I argue that from the Supreme Court’s grounding of the duty to consult in the honour of the 
Crown, the Court has furthered a check on the potential for unlawful infringement on 
Aboriginal rights in order to achieve reconciliation as relationship. Unilateral action that is not 
consistent with Aboriginal rights and the honour of the Crown has effectively been struck 
down by the Supreme Court, in favour of building relationships through dialogue in 
consultation. Indeed, Walters states “that the expansion of the duty to consult in recent years 
is the clearest sign that reconciliation as relationship does form an integral part of the 
Canadian conception of legality” (Walters, 2008, p. 183). The process of reconciliation as 
relationship is protected by the Crown’s duty of honourable dealing towards Indigenous 
peoples, which is born out of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.  
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I have attempted to lay out the theoretical arguments that surround 
reconciliation in the Canadian constitutional context. I argue that the most ideal mode of 
reconciliation is that which is observed through relational dialogue under the auspice of the 
duty to consult. Walter’s reconciliation as relationship demands a space for equal and 
balanced dialogue about Aboriginal rights. In its most ideal form, consultation is a place 
where normative understandings of Aboriginal rights are discussed from the perspectives of 
Indigenous peoples and the Crown. The duty to consult acts as a mechanism that restricts 
state infringement on Aboriginal rights because the Crown is bound to always act honourably. 
I will apply this argument to my analysis of the Supreme Court’s ruling on the role of the 
NEB in consultation.  
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3. Background and Context 
 
3.1 Inuit: A (Very) Brief Historical Background 
Inuit and their ancestors have lived in the Canadian Arctic from time immemorial. Today, the 
majority of Inuit live in 53 communities in Inuit Nunangat – the Inuktitut word for land, water 
and ice (Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2017). Geographically, Inuit Nunangat is comprised of four 
settlement areas: the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (Northwest Territories), Nunatsiavut 
(Labrador), Nunvik (Quebec), and Nunavut (Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2017).  
3.1.1 Inuit-European Relations 
Early contact between Inuit and Europeans began with the arrival of Martin Frobisher to 
Baffin Island in 1576 on his search for the Northwest Passage as a trade route to India and 
China (Legare, 2008, p. 100). Inuit relations with European explorers were characterized by 
scholars as ‘harmonious’ and unobtrusive (Damas, 1993, p. 5). Gradually, long-term contact 
with European explorers, whalers and fur traders shifted Inuit focus away from subsistence 
practices towards commercial practices like trapping. Nomadic livelihoods became less and 
less important, and many Inuit communities located themselves close to Hudson’s Bay 
Company (HBC) trading posts (Damas, 1993, p. 6).   
 
It was not until well into the 20th century that settler presence began to forcibly alter and 
drastically change the livelihoods of Inuit people. Regular contact between Canadian society 
and Inuit culture was motivated by a shift in governance ideologies following the Second 
World War, which focused on providing welfare (Clancy, 1967). During this period, Inuit 
settlement territory was under the administration of the Northwest Territories (N.W.T) 
government, which the federal branch of government maintained significant authority over 
(Clancy, 1967). The territory’s demographic was, and still is, composed of diverse First 
Nation, Métis and Inuit groups. The federal government’s delivery of welfare to Inuit resulted 
in centralization policies that forced Inuit into settled communities in order to receive health, 
education and social services (Legare, 2008). This form of intervention by the Canadian 
government has been labelled as ‘internal colonialism’, whereby the sedentarization of Inuit 
in villages resulted in dependency and the degradation of traditional practices central to Inuit 
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culture (Brody, 1991; Creery, 1993). Inuit were alienated from their lands and traditional 
ways of life, which permeated into family and kinship relations. Some authors described Inuit 
as wards of the federal government, a direct result of forced centralization and the newly 
created villages (Legare, 2008, p. 101).  
 
By the end of the 1960s, Inuit became increasingly resistant to the colonial policies of the 
federal government, leading to the formation of various Inuit socio-political organizations. 
Having been a society rooted in a tradition of self-governance, Inuit sought to regain 
autonomy over their lands and lives (Dickerson, 1992). The work of these organizations, and 
collective Inuit action, created the foundation for Inuit to negotiate and ultimately secure, a 
self-government arrangement under their own territory – Nunavut. The creation of the 
Nunavut territory can be understood within the context of dramatic relocation and 
assimilation policies of the federal government that took Inuit off the land and placed them 
into settlements. 
3.1.2 The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement – Governance Context 
The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) is a negotiated agreement between Nunavut 
Tunngavik Incorporated (on behalf of Inuit), the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the Northwest Territories, which transferred land title and governance autonomy to Inuit 
through the creation of the Nunavut territory. It was formally adopted by the Parliament of 
Canada in 1993 and came into effect in 1999. The NLCA is a contract in which Inuit 
exchanged and thereby extinguished Aboriginal title to their traditional lands for the rights 
and benefits recognized by the agreement (Legare, 2008, p. 102). Several central objectives of 
the NLCA were evident in many of the drafts presented before Ottawa for negotiation 
(Purich, 1992). Inuit sought sovereign ownership rights over parts of land, decision-making 
power over the management of land and resources, financial compensation and royalties from 
non-renewable resource development in the territory, and the creation of the Government of 
Nunavut (Legare, 2008). These objectives were achieved and are manifest in the composition 
of the agreement through the creation of various political institutions and management 
boards.13 Moreover, the NLCA clearly sets out and defines special rights for Inuit, 
particularly related to wildlife harvesting, education, language and governance (White, 2002).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) is the main instrument for wildlife management and 
conservation in Nunavut. It is the main institution for implementing and protecting harvesting rights of Inuit. 
The Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB) contributes to the protection of these rights by carrying out impact 
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3.2 The Community of Clyde River (in Inuktitut: Kanngiqtugaapik), Nunavut 
The Hamlet of Clyde River is a small community of about 1,000 people located on the 
northeastern coast of Baffin Island, an arm of the Davis Strait. It lies in the Baffin Mountain 
range, which form part of the Arctic Cordillera mountain range (Municipality of Clyde River, 
2016). The community, like many in Nunavut, is isolated and not accessible by road.  
 
The issue of food security is a challenge to many in Clyde River. The high cost of 
transportation drastically inflates prices of imported “market food” (Forum, 2007). Hunting 
and harvesting local “country food” is an important part of Clyde River Inuit livelihoods and 
kinship relations. Marine species such as bearded and ringed seals, narwhals, arctic char, 
polar bears, caribou and bowhead whales are crucial not only for Inuit subsistence, but 
equally for commercial purposes (Wenzel, 1985). The small commercial economies related to 
these species, particularly the polar bear sport hunt, is no less important, especially for Inuit in 
Clyde River with limited access to wage employment (Wenzel, 2011). As in many Nunavut 
communities, “up to half the adult men are either unemployed or limited to casual and/or 
seasonal work” (Wenzel, 2011, p. 459). The modernization of Inuit societies has meant that 
the tools of harvesting have changed. Traditionally, Inuit hunters used harpoons to kill seals 
and whales, dog sleds to reach ice floe, and Inuit Quajimajatuqangit (Inuit traditional 
knowledge - IQ)14 of the environment to navigate changing conditions. Although IQ is still an 
integral part of any hunt, Inuit hunters use rifles, snowmobiles and GPS systems to conduct a 
hunt. As a result of this modernization, hunters now have to cover the cost of maintaining 
their tools, which is typically expensive.15 Since the average per capita income for Inuit is 
CDN$20,000 (Wenzel, 2011, p. 459), paired with high unemployment, it is clear that 
participation in the mixed economy is necessary for access to income as well as the ability to 
maintain traditional food activities.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
assessments for project proposals, specifically addressing socio-economic and cultural impacts (Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement Act, 1993). 
14 For a discussion on the meaning and importance of Inuit Quajimajatuqangit see Wenzel, G. W. (2004). From 
TEK to IQ: Inuit Quajimajatuqangit and Inuit Cultural Ecology. Arctic Anthropology, 41(2), 238-250.; Tester, F. 
J., & Irniq, P. (2008) Inuit Quajimajatuqangit: Social History, Politics and the Practice of Resistance. Arctic, 48-
61. 
15 According to Wenzel (2011, p. 259), a litre of milk can cost as much as $5.25, a kilogram of ground beef up to 
$10.00 and a box of twenty .30-.60 calibre bullets may be $40.00. CBC reported in January 2017 that diesel 
prices for a vehicle were 19 cents lower than in 2016, at 1.1668/L (CBC News, 2017). 
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Shifts in the socio-economic practices of Inuit in Clyde River indicate the adaptability of IQ 
and traditional livelihoods (Harder & Wenzel, 2012). However, changes in climate and 
increases in natural resource development projects in the territory can exacerbate the pressure 
to adapt. Resistance from Inuit in Clyde River to any activity that would further this process 
exemplifies how important species like the seal and polar bear are for the community. 
Notwithstanding this, memories from the 1960s and 1970s era of seismic testing using 
dynamite generated justified bitterness. The communities of Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay and Clyde 
River witnessed dead seals, disrupted marine mammal migration and floating fish during 
these years, while knowing the possibility of high-risk drilling could come soon after 
(Nunatsiaq News, 2014). It is evident, then, why Inuit in Clyde River strongly opposed the 
seismic testing permit submitted by PGS given their previous experiences, cultural 
importance of traditional livelihood practices, and the vulnerability of those practices to rapid 
environmental changes.  
 
Before discussing the facts of the Clyde River case and the courts’ judgements, it will be 
helpful to discuss the broader role of the Supreme Court within Canada and the associated 
signaling it makes to the Canadian government. A look at the historical judgements on s.35 
cases involving the duty to consult will provide necessary background for how the Supreme 
Court has reached its judgement in Clyde River. Further, since my thesis will analyse the 
delegation of responsibility for the duty to consult to the NEB, it calls for a discussion on the 
statutes and mandates that dictate the regulatory processes involved in deciding on project 
authorization.  
3.3 Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the Duty to Consult 
The Supreme Court of Canada is the final court of appeals in the Canadian judicial system. 
The Court hears appeals from the decisions of the highest provincial and territorial courts, but 
most often from the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA). However, in order for an appeal to be 
heard, the Court must grant leave (permission). Leave is usually granted to cases that involve 
an issue or question that is important for the public. Generally, appeals are submitted when 
there is believed to be a question of constitutional importance. In such cases, the federal and 
provincial governments involved must be notified of the constitutional questions and 
permitted as interveners in the case (Supreme Court of Canada, 2017). This is because 
constitutional questions usually involve a contemplated government action, or a statute that 
infringes on a right.   
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3.3.1 The Supreme Court of Canada, Policymaking and Dialogue 
In the 1990s, the relationship between the judicial branch and the legislative branch in Canada 
received much attention as the subject of constitutional scholarship and political theory 
(Bakan, 1990; Kelly, 1999; McKay, 2001; Roach, 2001).16 Particularly, this scholarship has 
focused on developing different theories of institutional dialogue; between the various courts 
themselves, and between the courts and the legislature. As an institution charged with 
remedying social and constitutional injustices, the Supreme Court has been known to signal, 
or engage in dialogue with the legislature over important public policy matters (Kelly & 
Murphy, 2005). With the establishment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 and the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court has become increasingly prominent in influencing 
legislation. 
 
This idea of institutional dialogue extends to the adoption of s.35 in the Constitution Act 
1982, the same year as Charter entrenchment. Gordon Christie (2002, p. 41) explains that the 
constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights created a need for a new legal framework. Although 
s.35 was born in the political area, the judiciary was left to give substance to these rights. The 
jurisprudence on the duty to consult should be examined within the broader context of this 
need for a new legal framework and the expanded role of the Supreme Court. Judicial 
dialogue is also important for Aboriginal rights, particularly in the jurisprudence on the duty 
to consult, whereby the Courts have debated the substance of statutes and legislation which 
interact with the duty, like that of the NEB. Through judicial dialogue, the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Clyde River sends a prescriptive message to the legislature regarding the NEB’s 
mandate under the duty to consult.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This body of literature has often zeroed in on what is called judicial activism, positing that the Court has taken 
an expanded approach to the theory of institutional dialogue (Elliot, 2004; Manfredi 2004; Waldron, 2006), and 
placed itself above constitutional supremacy. Constitutional supremacy is a system of government that 
recognizes that the freedom of Parliament to make laws is constrained or cedes to the requirements of the written 
Constitution. In Canada, this was affirmed by the Supreme Court’s judgement in Reference re Secession of 
Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. With the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, judicial 
activism was heavily criticised, and labelled as potentially damaging for the balance of power under Canadian 
federalism (Manfredi, 2004; Waldron, 2006).  
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3.4 The Supreme Court and Aboriginal Rights Cases Under Section 35 
3.4.1 Important Cases for the Development of Reconciliation – Sparrow (1990) & Van 
der Peet (1996) 
At issue in Sparrow was the Aboriginal right to fish for subsistence and cultural purposes in 
view of conservation policy. In its first decision interpreting and applying s.35 of the 
Constitution Act 1982, the Supreme Court ruled in Sparrow that, although Aboriginal rights 
are not absolute and insulated from government action, “federal power must be reconciled 
with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification 
of any government regulation that infringes upon or denies Aboriginal rights” (Sparrow 1990: 
para. 1109). The Court, then, requires that the federal government provide a valid legislative 
objective for the justification of infringement (McNeil, 2003). In effect, if the Crown 
infringes upon an Aboriginal right, then it thereby has a duty to provide compelling 
justification in a way that is consistent with the honour of the Crown.  
 
The Van der Peet case involved a woman of the Sto:lo First Nation in British Columbia who 
was charged with selling fish without a licence (Walters, 2008). She claimed that she had an 
Aboriginal right to commercial fishing under s.35. Chief Justice Lamer, for the majority of 
the Supreme Court, stated that Aboriginal rights were affirmed under the Constitution by 
simple fact that ‘they were already here’ (Van der Peet 1996: para. 30). From this, Lamer C.J. 
concluded that the content of rights protected by the Constitution are those, which are 
‘directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the 
sovereignty of the Crown’ (Van der Peet 1996: para 31). It was held that peoples of the Sto:lo 
First Nation had no right to sell fish commercially, as the practice was only incidental, not 
integral, to pre-contact Sto:lo culture (McNeil, 2003, p.4). In effect, the result of Lamer C.J.’s 
recognition of Aboriginal rights is that s.35 rights can only be applied to pre-contact practices. 
  
Further, at the justification stage of the analysis in Van der Peet, reconciliation provided 
Lamer C.J. with a rationale for expanding the range of government action and legislative 
objectives on Aboriginal rights (McNeil, 2003, p. 8). Moreover, this judgement suggests that 
although an Aboriginal right to fish exists, it may be subjected to infringement on the basis of 
‘balancing’ broader Canadian interests towards the successful attainment of reconciliation 
(McNeil, 2003). It is clear that Lamer C.J. understood that Aboriginal rights, although 
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protected by the Constitution, might have to concede to the interests of other Canadians to 
achieve goals like economic and regional fairness. 
 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Beverley McLachlin was deeply critical about the issue of 
reconciliation in the context of justification of infringement on Aboriginal rights. In contrast 
to Lamer C.J., McLachlin J. argues that reconciliation should be found in the shared 
perspectives of Indigenous and Canadian legal cultures, and through negotiated agreements 
like those of treaties (Van der Peet 1996: para. 310). The goal of reconciliation, argued 
McLachlin J., cannot justify unilateral limitation on an Aboriginal right by the Crown for the 
purposes of social harmony. This would in fact diminish the substance of the Aboriginal right 
that s.35 of the Constitution guarantees (Van der Peet 1996: para 313). 
 
In the years following the Sparrow and Van der Peet cases, we see that the Supreme Court 
has found value in the Sparrow conception of reconciliation regarding rights and associated 
duties. The duty to consult restricts the Crown’s power to infringe on rights, as a means to 
reconcile the competing claims of sovereignty. Now I will turn to the cases that are most 
significant in the development of the duty to consult.  
3.4.2 Important Cases for the Development of the Duty to Consult - Haida Nation (2004), 
Rio Tinto (2010)  
Each of these cases dealt specifically with the content and scope of the duty to consult. In 
Haida, the Court formulated the three-element test for evaluating consultation, and 
determining whether the Crown owes the duty to consult (Newman, 2009, p. 24) As 
mentioned earlier, the three elements of the Haida test are the knowledge element of an 
Aboriginal right or title claim, the strength of the Aboriginal right or title claim itself, and the 
adverse impact of contemplated action on the Aboriginal right or title claim. What is 
significant in Haida is that the duty to consult is triggered even when there is an unproven or 
undetermined claim to Aboriginal title or right. The Crown is bound by honour, and it is not 
conceivably honourable to engage in adverse action upon knowledge that an Aboriginal claim 
has been made or right already exists under a treaty (Haida Nation, para: 32). Additionally, in 
Haida, the Court stated that the Crown may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to 
industry proponents, but the responsibility of consultation irrevocably rests with the Crown.  
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The Court in Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council17 also addressed the 
jurisdiction of administrative tribunals in fulfilling the duty to consult, and assessing the 
adequacy of Crown obligation (Harman, 2016). It ruled that the “duty on a tribunal to 
consider consultation and the scope of that inquiry depends on the mandate conferred by the 
legislation that creates the tribunal” (Rio Tinto: para: 55). Further, the Court expanded on 
Haida by ruling that the legislature may delegate the duty to a tribunal and it is up to 
governments to design the regulatory scheme to address procedural requirements of 
consultation. (Rio Tinto, para: 56). In its judgement, the Supreme Court also made note that 
consultation is ultimately “concerned with an ethic of ongoing relationships” (Newman, 2009, 
p. 21). This squarely places the duty to consult within an aim to reconcile the pre-existence of 
Aboriginal societies with the asserted sovereignty of the Crown.  
3.5 The National Energy Board’s Regulatory Process 
As mentioned above, the Clyde River case focused in part on the question of whether the NEB 
could conduct consultation on behalf of the Crown’s obligation under the duty to consult. The 
NEB is created and enabled by the National Energy Board Act, R.S.C. 1985, c N-7. It is an 
independent federal regulator that has quasi-judicial powers, along with the rights and 
privileges of a superior court, to evaluate and determine proposed activities related to oil and 
gas development (Gov. Canada, 2017). This means that NEB decisions are enforceable in 
law. For any activity that is under the NEB’s mandate of regulation, an application must be 
submitted. Further, the NEB’s involvement in a project does not end at approval but continues 
through the life cycle of the project. The quasi-judicial powers of the NEB consist of the 
examination of witnesses, the production and inspection of documents presented for project 
authorization, and the enforcement of its orders (NEB Act, 1985).  
 
The NEB Act is not the only piece of legislation that governs the NEB’s decision-making 
powers and defines its jurisdiction. The Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act (COGOA) 
prohibits any work or activity related to the exploration of oil or gas in federal waters unless it 
is authorized under paragraph 5(1)(b) of the Act by the NEB. This means that PGS’ seismic 
exploration survey in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait legally falls under the NEB’s regulatory 
and authorization process. Further, any authorization under COGOA paragraph 5 is also 
subject to any requirements demanded by the NEB (COGOA, 1985).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650, hereinafter Rio 
Tinto. 
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In the process of determining whether to grant authorization, the NEB is required to carry out 
an environmental impact assessment in certain instances. For instance, any geophysical or 
drilling project north of 60 degrees latitude requires an environmental impact assessment. The 
proposed location of such a project determines which other environmental assessment 
processes are used, and which Northern boards and agencies must be included (NEB Act, 
1985). The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012 (CEAA 2012) and the Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement (NLCA, 1993, (2)) require certain environmental impact assessments 
be conducted prior to final approval of a project authorization by the NEB. Under subsection 
2(1) of both the CEAA 2012 and its predecessor, CEAA 1992, explicit reference is made that 
environmental assessment must consider the effects of any changes that a project may cause 
in the environment, “including any change upon the current use of lands and resources for 
traditional purposes by Aboriginal persons” (CEAA, 1992 2(1)). Although the NEB has the 
jurisdiction over environmental assessment, project proponents are required to file 
information explaining the potential adverse impacts a project may create and any potential 
mitigation efforts to be employed. The NEB often acts as a coordinator in the environmental 
assessment process, and will determine whether mitigation efforts are sufficient enough for 
authorization to proceed. 
 
Of major importance in the Clyde River case was whether this section of the NEB Act enables 
the NEB to determine, by fact of law, whether the duty to consult has been met by the Crown. 
During the process of hearing major applications, the NEB holds public hearings where 
parties may submit evidence into the public record. The NEB holds that decisions must be 
based on the evidence submitted, and makes a decision that is based on the balancing of 
public interests. Throughout the NEB Act, it is consistently mentioned that the NEB is 
mandated to consider the public interest in all decision-making matters. How this 
responsibility interacts with Aboriginal rights claims and title is an issue that residents of 
Clyde River put to the Supreme Court.  
3.6 Hamlet of Clyde River v. Geo-Petroleum Services Inc.  
On May 17, 2011, PGS submitted an application for a Geophysical Operations Authorization 
(GOA) under paragraph 5 of the COGOA to conduct a 2D offshore seismic testing program in 
Baffin Bay and Davis Strait over five years during the open water season. On June 26, 2014 
the NEB authorized PGS to conduct seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait pursuant to 
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COGOA paragraph 5. The proposed testing would involve detonating air guns 100,000 times 
louder than a jet engine for 24 hours a day, five months per year, for a period of five years (H. 
of Clyde River, Mem. Fact 2015, para: 3). The purpose of this section is to briefly outline 
what consultation occurred between the submission of the GOA and its subsequent approval. 
Importantly, I will describe the role that the NEB played, the role that PGS played and the 
voiced experiences of Inuit in Clyde River. 
 
3.6.1 The Consultation Process 
Throughout the NEB’s approval process, the community of Clyde River made it explicitly 
clear that they were not against all natural resource extraction projects, but that they would 
only support projects if their traditional food, hunting economy and culture would not be 
substantially harmed. Inuit in Clyde River felt that a strategic environmental assessment 
(SEA) ought to be conducted to create a baseline understanding of how seismic testing could 
impact Inuit harvesting rights (H. of Clyde River, Mem. Fact 2015, para: 17). Clyde River 
and other Inuit organizations requested that the Federal Government become involved in this 
process prior to the NEB’s approval but their request was declined. Instead, the Government 
left it to the NEB to facilitate consultation between Clyde River and PGS. 
 
Of highest importance to Inuit in Clyde River were the potential effects seismic testing would 
have on marine species that they depend on for culture and livelihoods. Clyde River 
leadership articulated that community meetings were hastily scheduled, not providing enough 
time for residents to prepare and present their concerns before the NEB and PGS. In 2011, 
multiple petitions were signed from residents in Clyde River and surrounding communities to 
oppose the seismic testing. In a letter to the NEB, a representative from the community, Shari 
Gearheard, outlined key reasons for opposition: the poor process of local ‘consultation’ and 
the potential adverse impacts from testing (S. Gearheard correspondence, May 2011)18. The 
NEB and PGS considered local community meetings to be sufficient for consultation. 
However, Shari Gearheard explained that PGS’ presentations were jargon-ridden, not 
translated into the local language, and inaccessible. Throughout the consultation meetings 
representatives from representatives for PGS were simply unable or unwilling to show that 
Inuit rights and interests would be protected or at least considered.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Shari Gearheard’s letter is particularly illuminating. It can be found online: https://www.neb-
one.gc.ca/nrth/dscvr/2011tgs/cmmnt/2011-05-31shrgrhrd01-eng.pdf 
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In response to the concerns raised by Clyde River about the ‘consultation’ process, in 2012 
the NEB ordered PGS to conduct an environmental assessment (EA). After PGS had 
submitted their EA, it was distributed to community organizations for comment. Community 
meetings continued, but resembled the first round of consultations that occurred the year 
prior.  
 
In 2013, the NEB concluded that PGS’ project authorization application was incomplete and 
ordered the company to provide certain additional information if their application was to 
move forward. The NEB required that PGS provide answers to the outstanding questions 
raised by community members during consultation meetings, an explanation for how IQ 
would be considered in the project, and details of mitigation measures for potential harm to 
marine life (NEB correspondence, September 2013). PGS responded with a 3,926 page 
document addressing these requirements that was only in English. Once having reviewed this 
report, PGS’ application under COGOA paragraph 5 was authorized by the NEB. In granting 
this authorization, the NEB did not provide any reasons for its decision, nor did it make 
mention of whether the Crown’s duty to consult was discharged (NEB Correspondence, June 
2014). Further, in an examination of both the initial EA and the subsequent report there is no 
mention of Inuit rights under the NLCA or s.35 of the Constitution.  
 
3.6.2 The Federal Court of Appeal’s Decision 
The Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) ruled to dismiss Clyde River’s application for judicial 
review of the NEB’s COGOA authorization and held that consultation in this case was 
adequate (Clyde River, 2015 FCA 179). Additionally, the FCA confirmed that the Crown may 
delegate the procedural aspect of the duty to consult to a regulatory tribunal. In pinpointing 
the moment the duty to consult was triggered, the FCA agreed with the Attorney General that 
it was triggered when Inuit in Clyde River requested to the Cabinet Minister that a baseline 
strategic environmental assessment be carried out. This means that the duty was triggered not 
when PGS submitted a proposal or COGOA authorization, but when a clear agent of the 
Crown was brought into the regulatory process of the NEB. The consequences of this 
determination are later explored in the Supreme Court’s ruling. Further, the Court concluded 
that the NEB Act provides an established process of consultation designed to ensure the 
gathering of sufficient information about the project’s potential impacts on Aboriginal rights. 
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However, it found no issue with the NEB’s lack of reasoning for its authorization and its 
omission of any reference to Aboriginal rights. It held that the EA provided adequate reasons 
and responses to Inuit concerns about potential adverse environmental impacts (Clyde River, 
2015 FCA 179, para: 93).  
 
When the case was heard by the Supreme Court, there was evidently a different outcome. 
Consultation in Clyde River was ruled to be inadequate. However, in delivering its ruling the 
Court responded to four important questions that were raised by the lawyers representing 
Clyde River. An analysis of the Court’s responses to these questions will be useful for 
explaining the Supreme Court’s decision.  
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4. Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Judgement in Clyde River 
 
Prior to Clyde River, there has been little clarity around the role that regulatory tribunals play 
in carrying out consultation (Bankes, 2012; Promislow, 2013). This is in part due to confusion 
around whether a regulatory board like the NEB can be considered as an agent of the Crown. 
Specifically, scholars have discussed the ability, or lack thereof, of regulatory tribunals to 
adhere to the requirements of s.35 in a consultative context (Graben & Sinclair, 2016). The 
result of this is that regulatory tribunals are often imprudent about their relationship with the 
Crown in the context of the duty to consult, thereby affecting consultation process. While the 
Supreme Court has included regulatory tribunals in the task of ensuring that Aboriginal rights 
are respected and determined that tribunals can use their own methods of evaluation, it 
remained unclear whether they are required to assess consultation in accordance with any 
established legal criteria. The Clyde River case provides some clarity by confirming that the 
Crown can rely on the NEB to satisfy the duty to consult, while simultaneously evaluating 
whether the duty to consult has been satisfied. This is because regulatory tribunals act in 
accordance with their enabling statute. If the statute provides a mandate to answer questions 
of law, the Supreme Court has said that this extends to constitutional matters of law, including 
s.35 (Graben & Sinclair, 2016).  
 
In my analysis, I will first provide an explanation of the precedents and Aboriginal case law 
the Supreme Court used to consider the questions of law before it. Second, I will examine the 
four questions presented to the Supreme Court regarding the NEB and its role in executing the 
duty to consult. In doing so, this examination will provide an understanding of how the Clyde 
River case has relieved some uncertainty around the extent to which regulatory tribunals both 
act upon the law and are bound by the law in carrying out consultation. Third, I will argue 
that the Supreme Court’s ruling that the NEB can consider Crown consultation before an 
approval is founded, however the NEB’s current mandate is insufficient with regards to 
addressing and considering Aboriginal rights. Accordingly, I will argue that for the NEB’s 
mandate to become sufficient, a mechanism for addressing Aboriginal rights ought to be built 
into the regulatory process for when the duty to consult is triggered. Lastly, I will explain why 
the NEB’s mandate is insufficient.  
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4.1 The Analytical Framework Used by the Supreme Court 
The lawyers for Clyde River had argued that the NEB’s regulatory process alone could not 
possibly fulfil the duty to consult because direct Crown involvement is necessary. The Court 
ruled that, although a regulatory process can be empowered to conduct consultation, it would 
still always be the responsibility of the Crown to ensure consultation was adequate (Clyde 
River, para: 23). As both the Crown and Inuit are parties to the NLCA, each are bound to act 
diligently to implement the treaty. As such, the Court ruled that it was appropriate that Inuit 
requested direct Crown engagement through the baseline strategic environmental assessment. 
Further, the Crown has a responsibility by the honour of the Crown to provide guidance about 
the form of consultation so that Indigenous peoples can be fully informed about the process 
(Clyde River, para: 23). This also enables the Indigenous group to raise concerns about the 
pending consultation process.  
 
The Supreme Court narrowed its attention on the consequences of inadequate consultation, 
stating that where consultation is inadequate, the decision or authorization should be quashed 
(Clyde River, para: 24). While simultaneously reaffirming that the Crown can rely on 
regulatory tribunals to carry out consultations, the Court maintained that this process must 
occur adequately. In this case, the meaning of adequate is linked directly back to the sliding 
scale outlined in Haida.  
4.2 The Four Questions 
4.2.1 Can the NEB approval process trigger the duty to consult? 
Because the duty to consult was triggered by the NEB’s COGOA paragraph 5 authorization 
process, then the required action falls along a spectrum from limited to deep consultation as 
defined in Haida. The Court had to determine where consultation should lie on the spectrum, 
depending upon the strength of Clyde River’s right, and the significance of the potential 
impact on the right (Clyde River, para: 20).   
 
As defined in Haida, the duty to consult is triggered when the Crown has knowledge of a 
potential Aboriginal claim or Aboriginal treaty right that might be adversely impacted by 
Crown action. In Clyde River, the FCA was of the view that only action by a minister of the 
Crown or a government department, or a Crown corporation can constitute ‘Crown conduct’ 
that would trigger the duty (Clyde River, para: 26). However, the Supreme Court argued that 
it was the NEB’s approval process specifically that triggered the duty in this case.  
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The Court defined Crown conduct as any conduct that the Canadian state exercises in the 
“prerogatives and privileges reserved to it” (Clyde River, para: 28). The NEB is neither ‘the 
Crown’ nor an agent of the Crown. It operates independently of the Crown’s ministers and 
there is no relationship of control that exists between them (Hogg, Monahan, & Wright, 2011, 
p. 465). Nevertheless, the NEB’s mandated responsibility under COGOA paragraph 5 enables 
the NEB to act on behalf of the Crown when making a decision on a project application. As 
such, the Court’s ruling dissolves any distinction between the Crown’s action and the NEB’s 
action because the NEB exists to exercise executive power as authorized to do so by its 
enabling legislation. Both the duty to consult and the honour of the Crown do not simply 
evaporate because a final decision has been made by a tribunal established by Parliament as 
opposed to Cabinet (Chippewas of the Thames, para: 105). The duty is triggered regardless of 
whether action is by or on behalf of the Crown (Clyde River, para: 25). 
4.2.2 Can the Crown rely on the NEB’s process to fulfil the duty to consult? 
This question directs attention to whether the NEB has sufficient procedural powers to enable 
appropriate consultation. The Court concluded that under COGOA, the NEB has a significant 
mandate that permits extensive consultation (Clyde River, para: 31). The Court justified this 
by referencing the powers it holds to conduct hearings, elicit information, conduct EAs, and 
demand preconditions to approvals. However, what the Court found most significant was that 
the NEB can require accommodation by exercising its discretion to deny an authorization or 
reserving its decision pending further proceedings (COGOA s.5(1)(b), s.5(5)). Notably, the 
Court’s submitted that the NEB has developed “considerable institutional expertise in 
conducting consultations and assessing environmental impacts, especially when this overlaps 
with Indigenous interests” (Clyde River, para: 33). In sum, the NEB has the procedural 
powers necessary to implement consultation and the remedial powers to accommodate 
affected Aboriginal rights. This means that the Crown can therefore rely on the NEB to 
completely or partially fulfil the duty to consult. 
4.2.3 What is the NEB’s role in considering Crown consultation before approval? 
Next, the Supreme Court considered whether the NEB could assess if adequate consultation 
has occurred and that the Crown’s duty to consult has been fulfilled. The lawyers for Clyde 
River argued that the NEB must exercise its decision-making authority in accordance with 
s.35 of the Constitution by evaluating the adequacy of consultation prior to authorization. The 
Supreme Court agreed. Unless the authority to decide constitutional issues has been clearly 
excluded, a regulatory tribunal with the authority to decide questions of law has both the duty 
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and authority to apply the Constitution. It follows that the NEB has the authority to determine 
whether the Crown’s duty to consult has been fulfilled.  
 
Interestingly, the Court added that when an affected Indigenous group has raised concerns 
about Crown consultation to the NEB, the NEB must address those concerns by expressing its 
reasoning (Clyde River, para: 41). This would seem to further limit Crown power by imposing 
obligations on the manner and approach of government in its engagement of its duty to 
consult. Explicitly, the Supreme Court suggests that written reasons should be provided as a 
means of showing affected Indigenous groups that their concerns were considered and 
addressed. Where deep consultation is required by the Haida spectrum, the honour of the 
Crown will usually oblige the NEB to explain how it considered and addressed these 
concerns. This resembles a process of Walter’s concept of ‘reconciliation as relationship’ that 
engages the duty to consult to create dialogue and respect about the concerns of each party.  
4.2.4 Was the consultation adequate in this case? 
Owing to the strength of Clyde River’s claim and the significant potential impact on the 
community’s treaty rights, it was unanimous among the Court that deep consultation was 
required by the Haida spectrum (Clyde River, para: 43). It was clear that Inuit in Clyde River 
had established treaty rights under the NLCA to hunt and harvest marine animals. 
Additionally, the risks posed by the proposed testing were also high.19 
 
The Court ruled that what did occur in terms of consultation was not adequate. It went on to 
list the ways in which consultation fell short in this case. First, the consultative inquiry was 
misdirected towards environmental impacts, not the impacts on Inuit rights (Clyde River, 
para: 45). The NEB did not address Inuit treaty rights to hunt and harvest marine mammals, 
but focused the consultation on environmental impacts. Second, while the Crown relies on the 
processes of the NEB to fulfil the duty to consult, this was not made explicit to Inuit in Clyde 
River (Clyde River, para: 46). Inuit in Clyde River had expressed apprehension to participate 
in the NEB processes because of the uncertainty around whether participation would amount 
to Crown consultation. Lastly, the Court felt that the NEB processes simply did not 
implement the requirements of deep consultation (Clyde River, para: 47). In view of the 
Court, despite the NEB’s statutory powers that enable it to conduct deep consultation, limited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The NEB’s environmental assessment highlighted the risks posed to marine mammals from seismic testing: 
increased mortality, permanent hearing damage, and changes in migration routes. These are all concerns Inuit in 
Clyde River raised prior to the EA.  
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opportunities for consultation were made available to Inuit in Clyde River. While the NEB 
did consider the potential impacts of the project on the environment and on resource use, the 
NEB’s report did not acknowledge Inuit treaty rights to harvest wildlife or that deep 
consultation was required.  
4.3 An Insufficient Mandate 
The significance of the Court’s ruling in Clyde River with respect to the role of regulatory 
tribunals is two-fold. A regulatory tribunal’s mandate that not only enables it to assess 
questions of law permits that tribunal to both carry out consultation on behalf of the Crown 
through its own regulatory process, but also to simultaneously evaluate whether the Crown 
adequately fulfilled its duty to consult. It might appear paradoxical with respect to the fairness 
of the law for a regulatory tribunal to both conduct consultation on behalf of the Crown and 
evaluate whether that consultation adequately fulfils the Crown’s duty to consult. However, 
the Supreme Court provided justification for this. In this case, the NEB Act provides the NEB 
with the authority to consider questions of law, including those that are constitutional, thereby 
extending its jurisdiction to questions of law on Aboriginal rights. This means that the NEB 
must make decisions for approval in accordance with the jurisprudence on s.35 rights. 
Although this decision is legally founded, I argue that in its current form, the NEB’s mandate 
is not sufficient to address and consider Aboriginal rights in a manner that is consistent with 
the requirements of the duty to consult. 
 
To show this, I will focus my attention on the Supreme Court’s first and third reason for 
concluding that consultation in Clyde River was inadequate. To support my argument, I will 
demonstrate that the NEB has consistently failed, in a characteristic pattern, to meaningfully 
approach the duty to consult in a way that is consistent with the doctrine itself. Clyde River 
closely resembles this pattern of conduct.20  
4.3.1 Misdirected Inquiry – Adverse Effects, Not Impacts 
The first reason the Supreme Court gave for concluding that consultation was inadequate was 
that the NEB’s inquiry was misdirected. The NEB found that the proposed seismic testing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Because of the scope of my thesis, I cannot conduct my own empirical review of NEB decisions where 
consultation issues were outstanding, so I have relied on the comprehensive research of Graben, S., & Sinclair, 
A. (2016). “Administering Consultation at the National Energy Board: Evaluating Tribunal Authority” in P. 
Macklem, & D. Sanderson, From Recognition to Reconciliation (pp. 238-255). Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press.; Charowsky, Z. (2011). “The Aboriginal Law Duty to Consult: An Introduction for Administrative 
Tribunals” Saskatchewan Law Review, 213-230.; Lambrecht, K. (2013). Aboriginal Consultation, 
Environmental Assessment and Regulatory Review. Regina: University of Regina Press. 
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was not likely to cause significant environmental impacts, and that any impacts on traditional 
resource use could be minimized through mitigation measures. The inquiry should not have 
been directed at environmental impacts, but instead properly directed at the impact on the 
Aboriginal right (Clyde River, para: 45). No consideration was given in the NEB’s EA to the 
source – the NLCA – of the Inuit right to harvest marine mammals, nor to the impact of 
proposed seismic testing on those rights. In their study of the NEB’s written decisions for 
project authorization regarding the duty to consult, Sari Graben and Abbey Sinclair (2016, p. 
251) found that often where environmental impacts can be mitigated, the NEB rules that there 
is no adverse impact on Aboriginal rights. It is clear that the NEB’s consideration of Inuit 
harvesting rights conforms to this general pattern. 
 
It appears that the NEB simply did not understand that what is required of consultation, 
especially deep consultation, is a consideration of adverse effects on rights. That Aboriginal 
rights have been enshrined in the Constitution under s.35 and are safeguarded by the duty to 
consult is not something to overlook. What explains this misdirection is the insufficiency of 
the NEB Act on addressing Aboriginal concerns, wherein no reference to legal criteria for 
evaluating adverse impacts on rights exists (Graben & Sinclair, 2016, p. 254).21 The NEB Act 
allows it “to consider any public interest that may be affected” when deciding whether to 
grant an authorization (NEB Act, 1985). Historically, the task of evaluating the public interest 
meant the balancing of positive and negative effects of a potential project against economic, 
environmental and social interests (Popowich, 2007). Since the enactment of the Constitution 
Act 1982 and s.35 rights, the task of evaluating public interest must also consider impacts on 
Aboriginal peoples and their rights. However, the duty to consult affords Aboriginal rights a 
type of consideration that is independent of the generic public interest analysis, depending on 
the strength of the right (Popowich, 2007). In looking at the misdirected inquiry of the NEB 
in Clyde River, it seems that its mandate does not dictate legal criteria that its consultative 
attention should be placed on the potential of adverse impacts on Aboriginal rights.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Graben and Sinclair conducted a study between 2000 and 2014 of 100 NEB project approvals. Of those 100 
approvals, they found 42 referenced the duty to consult and that 41 of those 42 were approved. They further 
analysed the NEB’s written decisions for these approvals and found that the NEB relies on three justifications 
for approving an application where the issue of consultation remained unresolved. These three reasons were: (1) 
that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the consultation at issue, (2) that it believes outstanding consultation can be 
addressed through ongoing consultation by the project proponent and/or (3) that the absence of mitigation 
impacts on Aboriginal rights equated to an absence of adverse impacts on rights. See: Graben, S., & Sinclair, A. 
(2016), p. 239.	  
	   28	  
4.3.2 The Hearing Process – Requirements of Deep Consultation 
The third reason delivered by the Supreme Court in Clyde River for concluding that 
consultation was inadequate was that the NEB did not take sufficient measures to fulfil the 
required duty of deep consultation. According to Haida, deep consultation would require “the 
opportunity to make submissions for consideration, formal participation in the decision-
making process, and provision of written reasons to show that Aboriginal concern were 
considered” (para: 44). Despite the NEB’s authority under COGOA to afford these directives 
of the Court, only limited options for participation in the hearing process were made available 
to Inuit. During the NEB’s regulatory approval process, there were no formal hearings, only 
community meetings that served as question and answer forums. Additionally, participant 
funding was not afforded to representatives in Clyde River, making it difficult to test the 
evidence presented by PGS in the EA (Clyde River, para: 47). Compounded by the NEB’s 
failure to produce clear reasons for its approval and a lack of any mention of Inuit treaty 
rights in the EA, consultation did not appear to significantly affect its decision to authorize 
PGS’ seismic testing.  
 
This can be explained by the accommodations the NEB recorded in the EA report (NEB 
correspondence, September 2013). Once PGS had returned with a more robust EA report that 
included mitigation measures, the NEB noted changes made to the project as a result of 
consultation. The most important accommodation in this report was the commitment to 
ongoing consultation, including after the seismic testing had begun, on the part of PGS. It is 
alarming that the NEB considered a commitment to ongoing consultation as both 
simultaneously fulfilling consultation and providing some kind of accommodation. This 
demonstrates the NEB’s lack of understanding that adequate consultation must be completed 
prior to a project’s approval, and that the promise of ongoing consultation cannot make up for 
an insufficient consultation process. Graben and Sinclair (2016, p. 249) have found the 
acceptance of ongoing consultation to be characteristic of the NEB in justifying a decision for 
project approval. They argue that the NEB works with the understanding that consultation 
need not be complete prior to approval. A NEB mandate that does not make it explicit that 
Aboriginal rights are the focus of inquiry for consultation, as it is required by the 
jurisprudence on the duty to consult, cannot be argued to be sufficient.  
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4.4 The Failures of the NEB in Clyde River 
In addition to possessing the power to consider questions of law, an effective regulatory 
tribunal must be able to meaningfully address the specific concerns raised by Indigenous 
peoples about their rights (Graben & Sinclair, 2016; Hodgson, 2016). Taken together, the 
insufficiency of the NEB in its inquiry and in its hearing process shows that the NEB is 
limited in its statutory mandate. Currently, it appears that this insufficiency has led the NEB 
to discount the duty to consult as a determining factor in its regulatory approval process. The 
reason for this is that the NEB does not evaluate the adequacy of Crown consultation against 
any visible legal criteria related to rights within their mandate (Graben & Sinclair, 2016). 
Additionally, the NEB has not concerned itself with applying legal analysis to determine 
whether the duty to consult was triggered, the scope of the duty and whether it has been 
fulfilled. The NEB’s misdirected inquiry and its weak attempt at facilitating a robust hearing 
process is evidence of this. Further, this insufficiency has led to a situation where, Graben and 
Sinclair (2016, p. 238) have argued, the Crown is “permitted to rely on the NEB’s findings for 
approval made in the absence of legal criteria for the purposes of fulfilling its own legal 
duties.” 
4.5 Summary  
I have argued that the NEB does not have a sufficient mandate to understand what is required 
of consultation on Aboriginal rights and therefore does not properly consider whether the 
Crown’s duty to consult has been fulfilled. In examining the Supreme Court’s judgement in 
Clyde River, evidence of this is found in the NEB’s misdirected inquiry and the weak hearing 
process. In arguing that the NEB does not have a sufficient mandate to conduct adequate 
consultation, I am not referring to the authorities granted to it under the NEB Act. The 
Supreme Court in Clyde River concluded that the NEB has sufficient procedural powers that 
allow it to conduct consultation, whether consultation falls on the shallow or deep end of the 
spectrum. Rather, the NEB’s mandate does not provide sufficient direction on how to 
understand its role in the consultative process engaging Aboriginal rights. As a result, the 
NEB has consistently failed to understand, consider or respond to the critical concerns of 
Aboriginal rights.  
 
If the NEB merely documents proponents efforts to engage with communities – as it did in 
Clyde River - but it does not evaluate the efforts of consultation on rights, then it effectively 
does what the Crown may not: play a role in authorizing conduct that infringes rights. If this 
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is the case, then what does this mean for an understanding of Walter’s reconciliation as 
relationship and the role of the duty to consult within that space? This will be the focus of my 
second analytical chapter.  
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5. Returning to Reconciliation and the Duty to Consult 
 
I now return to the topic of legal reconciliation to explain how the outcomes from the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Clyde River might affect the potential to produce Walter’s concept 
of reconciliation as relationship.  
 
Earlier, I argued that the duty to consult creates the most effective means for reconciliation by 
requiring dialogue. This argument relies on Walter’s concept of reconciliation as relationship. 
Walter’s (2008, p. 187) model demands the judiciary to “acknowledge the frailty of law’s 
moral authority in relation to Indigenous peoples” because of the unilateral nature of the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty. The Supreme Court has done so, in part, through the 
articulation of the duty to consult and the dialogue it is to generate.  
 
What, then, does the Clyde River case demonstrate about the ability of the duty to consult to 
further reconciliation as relationship? I have argued that the Clyde River case is further 
evidence that the NEB’s mandate is not sufficient to produce a meaningful process of 
consultation that adequately considers and addresses Aboriginal rights. Although the Supreme 
Court did not explicitly denounce the insufficiency of the NEB’s mandate, it nevertheless 
implies that changes need to be made. The Supreme Court’s ruling does not depart from the 
idea that the duty to consult is an important space for generating meaningful dialogue about 
Aboriginal rights. The Court, I will argue, was faced with inherent institutional constraint in 
prescribing what it sees as a solution. Judicial dialogue, however, is a means for the Supreme 
Court to overcome the institutional constraints it faces and signal to the legislature any 
shortcomings it observes of statutes and legislation. I will argue that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in the Clyde River case implicitly expresses similar concerns about the failures of the 
NEB that I have described above.  
5.1 Overcoming Institutional Constraints 
In the Clyde River case, the Supreme Court could not directly propose legislative changes to 
the NEB’s mandate. The Court can only rule on the legality and constitutionality of statutes 
and laws but cannot re-write them. Legally, the NEB’s mandate enables it to fulfil the 
Crown’s duty to consult and further evaluate the adequacy of consultation. However, the 
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judgement that Clyde River consultation was inadequate suggests that the Supreme Court 
may well recognize the insufficiency of the NEB’s mandate in its current form. This is best 
demonstrated in the Court’s explanation that “despite the NEB’s broad powers under 
COGOA to afford the advantages of deep consultation, limited opportunities for participation 
and consultation were made available to Inuit” (Clyde River, para: 47). This suggests that the 
Supreme Court recognizes the constitutionality of the NEB’s mandate in fulfilling the duty to 
consult, but that it also witnesses the insufficiency of the NEB to carry out their mandate in a 
manner that is consistent with the Court’s prescription of meaningful consultation.  
 
Although the Court cannot prescribe what the NEB’s mandate should contain to enable it to 
sufficiently fulfil the duty to consult, it can overcome this constraint in a number of ways. 
First, it can enact procedural protections that enable meaningful dialogue about Aboriginal 
rights. Recalling Haida, the Court described the Haida spectrum on the duty to consult as 
procedural protections required for meaningful consultation (Clyde River, para: 47). 
Emphasizing that consultative inquiry must be directed at rights (rather than environmental 
effects) was one way in which the Supreme Court in Clyde River prescribed the duty to 
consult as a dialogue mechanism. The Court’s dissatisfaction with the NEB’s failure to 
provide reasons for its approval is further evidence of the Court promoting dialogue under the 
duty to consult. Providing reasons for approval is an important part of dialogue in 
consultation and a way to uphold the honour of the Crown (Clyde River, para: 48).  
 
Although no court can order Walter’s reconciliation as relationship, the Court’s ruling in 
Clyde River suggests that it can be a normative principle that helps to unify the Crown’s and 
Indigenous peoples’ interpretation of legal rights and duties. (Walters, 2008, p. 186). This 
type of dialogue occurring through consultation is an essential component of reconciliation as 
relationship.  
 
Another way the Supreme Court can express concerns about practices is through judicial 
dialogue (Roach, 2001). If the Court rules that a law is unconstitutional, it requires that the 
government re-write the law or abandon it. In cases where a law is not strictly 
unconstitutional, it can only imply a need for review on behalf of the government. In Clyde 
River, the Court affirmed the NEB’s mandate as legally sufficient to delegate consultation 
through its regulatory process. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that in consulting Inuit about the 
seismic testing proposal, the NEB’s regulatory process failed considerably. Simply put, 
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although the NEB has the statutory authority and technical capability to conduct 
consultations, this does not mean its existing regulatory process is sufficient to produce 
consultation which gives sufficient respect for Aboriginal rights to meet the requirements of 
s.35.  
 
In Clyde River, the Court explains that procedural protections exist under the doctrine of the 
duty to consult to ensure meaningful consultation. Further, the Court makes it clear that these 
protections should “foster reconciliation by promoting an ongoing relationship” (Clyde River, 
para: 47). In articulating this, it is obvious that the Court is emphasizing the importance of 
relationships built through dialogue. The Supreme Court is signaling to the legislature that 
relationships are an integral part of reconciling the pre-existence of Indigenous peoples and 
societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty. Using the concept of judicial dialogue, the 
message delivered by the Supreme Court in Clyde River becomes clear. The NEB’s mandate 
is constitutionally sufficient for the Crown to delegate the duty to consult, but in its current 
form, the NEB’s regulatory process has proven itself substantially deficient. This means that 
it is now the discretion of the legislature to respond to the Supreme Court’s ruling and 
legislatively address the NEB’s mandate. With this, the issue of consultation moves from the 
legal realm and into the political realm.  
5.2 Summary 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Clyde River provides evidence that the duty to consult was 
developed to ensure space for dialogue and an ongoing relationship between two 
sovereignties. This evidence of the Court’s embodiment of reconciliation as relationship. 
Despite institutional constraints in making decisions regarding law, the Supreme Court is able 
to signal to the legislature that the NEB’s mandate need be revised if it is to properly fulfil the 
duty to consult on behalf of the Crown. In Haida, Rio Tinto and Clyde River, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that judicial review should not be used as a substitute for adequate 
consultation. The Clyde River case is an example of where the NEB’s mandate failed in 
facilitating meaningful consultation, and where the Supreme Court saw this as an opportunity 
to reiterate the importance of the duty to consult in order to respect Aboriginal rights under 
s.35.  
 




In Haida, the Supreme Court first established the duty to consult as a s.35 right and created a 
sliding scale of requirements for consultation. In Rio Tinto, the Court confirmed that 
regulatory tribunals can be delegated the duty to consult if their enabling statute legally 
allows it. Although the decisions in these two cases provided clarity on the meaning of the 
duty to consult and the actors allowed to participate in consultation, the Supreme Court is not 
able to foresee issues before they arise. Leading up to the Clyde River case, the precise 
interaction of regulatory tribunals and their mandates in the duty to consult was legally 
unclear. This created a situation where governments, Indigenous peoples, and industry 
proponents were uncertain of the legal rules and normative principles guiding their 
relationships, particularly when issues around Aboriginal rights arose under the duty to 
consult (Popowich, 2007; Newman, 2009; Promislow, 2013). The NEB’s weak consultation 
process with the Clyde River community about seismic a seismic testing application is a clear 
result of this environment of uncertainty. The industry proponents did not understand the 
importance of responding directly to Inuit concerns about impacts on their ability to harvest 
marine species. Inuit community members in Clyde River were not made aware that the 
NEB’s regulatory process would fulfil the Crown’s duty to consult. And further, the NEB did 
not fully grasp what it meant for a consultation to consider and address Inuit concerns in a 
manner consistent with the honour of the Crown.  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision confirmed that the NEB’s legal powers are sufficient for the 
Crown to rely, in part or in full, on the board’s regulatory process to fulfil the duty to consult 
and, simultaneously, to evaluate that consultation. In the same judgement, however, the Court 
ruled that the NEB’s regulatory process did not organize the level of deep consultation 
required. 
 
The decision also reiterated the Supreme Court’s decision in Rio Tinto about regulatory 
tribunals, but, it expanded the procedural requirements of the duty to consult when a 
regulatory tribunal is conferred the authority to conduct consultation.  
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The significance of the Clyde River case lies in the ruling’s contribution to resolving some 
uncertainty around the central role regulatory tribunals play in the duty to consult, and 
specifically, in considering and addressing Aboriginal rights. The Supreme Court clarified 
that the duty to consult has a dual purpose: to protect Aboriginal rights and title claims, and to 
create a space for dialogue about reconciling these rights with Crown sovereignty.  
 
Despite the Court’s ruling in Clyde River, the NEB’s mandate remains insufficient if the duty 
to consult is meant to affect meaningful dialogue about reconciliation of two sovereignties. 
Under the NEB, the regulatory process has consistently failed to address potential impacts on 
Aboriginal rights, focussing its attention instead on the environmental effects. The result, as 
the Clyde River case demonstrates, is that regulatory approval is often granted without 
adequate concern for the consequences on Aboriginal rights. In effect, consultation proceeds 
in the opposite direction as intended under the duty to consult, and damages the honour of the 
Crown as a result. Further, the trend of delegating procedural aspects of consultation onto the 
proponent moves the duty to consult further from its source – the honour of the Crown and 
the aim of legal reconciliation. This has implications for the ability of the duty to consult to 
affect legal reconciliation – an imperative articulated by the Supreme Court through s.35 
jurisprudence.  
 
A detailed prescription for making the NEB’s mandate sufficient is outside the scope of this 
thesis. Morris Popowich (2007, pp. 858-860) has suggested a variety of means to improve the 
NEB.22 Any proposed changes to the NEB’s mandate need be directed at ensuring that it can 
appropriately consider and address Indigenous peoples’ concerns about their rights under the 
duty to consult. The Supreme Court has made it clear in the Clyde River case that the NEB’s 
mandate and regulatory process can enable it to fulfil the duty to consult. Any agency 
carrying out consultative functions should be involved in facilitating an ongoing engagement 
between the Crown, Indigenous peoples and industry proponents in order to enable an 
approach to reconciliation as relationship. To the extent that the duty to consult is the most 
appropriate space for this type of legal reconciliation to occur, the NEB’s regulatory process 
must reflect this.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Popowich has proposed that for large-scale natural resource development projects, a separate government 
agency created for the exclusive purpose of fulfilling the duty to consult may be better suited. Within the quasi-
judicial model, Popwich is sceptical of the NEB’s capacity to absorb any additional duties, including those 
flowing from s.35 of the Constitution. See: Popowich, M. (2007). “The National Energy Board as Intermediary 
Between the Crown, Aboriginal Peoples, and Industry”. Alberta Law Review, 837-862.	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In May 2017, the Liberal Federal Government announced that it would be undertaking a 
process to modernize the NEB’s mandate to more appropriately consider its role in the duty to 
consult (CBC News, 2017; Goujard, 2017). Notwithstanding that this announcement came 
prior to the delivery of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Clyde River, this response from the 
Federal government will hopefully reform the consultative issues highlighted by the NEB’s 
regulatory failures in this case. Inevitably, the duty to consult will play an integral role not 
only in properly reconciling the two legal claims to sovereignty, but also in furthering the 
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